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In “Beyond Constraining and Enabling: Toward New Microfoundations in 
Institutional Theory” Professor Cardinale (2018) seeks to expose and 
correct “shortcomings” (p.133) in institutional theory’s conceptualization of 
structure, agency and their relationship. To this end, he theorizes the 
“different mechanism[s] through which actors are embedded in structure” 
(p.134). We agree that institutional theory’s microfoundations merit 
theoretical attention and development. However, we question the premise 
that the issue of agency in institutional theory is adequately, or even 
plausibly, formulated as one of “embeddedness”. We also challenge the 
relevance of Professor Cardinale’s engagement of Husserl to help solve 
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In “Beyond Constraining and Enabling: Toward New Microfoundations in 
Institutional Theory” Professor Cardinale (2018) seeks to expose and correct 
“shortcomings” (p.133) in institutional theory’s conceptualization of structure, agency 
and their relationship. To this end, he theorizes the “different mechanism[s] through 
which actors are embedded in structure” (p.134). We agree that institutional theory’s 
microfoundations merit theoretical attention and development. However, we question 
the premise that the issue of agency in institutional theory is adequately, or even 
plausibly, formulated as one of “embeddedness”. We also challenge the relevance of 
Professor Cardinale’s engagement of Husserl to help solve what we argue to be a 
phantom problem central to his theory.  
Embedded Agency as a Phantom Problem 
When Seo and Creed (2002) introduced the term “paradox of embedded agency” in 
institutional theory they stressed that it only entailed an “apparent” contradiction; one 
that, to their satisfaction at least, had already been addressed by Barley and Tolbert 
(1997) who, drawing on Giddens (1984), conceived of the “mutually constitutive 
relationship between institutionalized scripts and [their] local reenactment” (Seo & 
Creed, 2002: 224, italics added). So, how did this “apparent” contradiction come to be 
treated as a central problem in institutional theory, as claimed by Cardinale (2018), 
rather than as a paradox?   
We believe the answer lies in the naturalization
1
 of the metaphor of 
“embeddedness” in institutional theory, and the associated theorization of the relation 
between structure and agency as semi-independent forces that influence each other. 
“Embedded” means “set firmly into a mass or material” (Merriam-Webster, 2017): it 
implies that “agency” is “set firmly into” a surrounding “mass” called “structure”. 
                                                        
1 Following Berger and Luckmann (1966), by “naturalization” we mean the unreflexive rendering of a 
particular understanding of the world as normal, self-evident, and commonsensical. This meaning is derived 
from Husserl’s (1910) “natürliche Weltbegriff” and Scheler’s (1960) “relativnatürliche Weltanschauung”. 






























































Giddens (1984) has likened this type of conceptualization to the walls of a room from 
which an individual cannot escape (signifying “embeddedness”), but inside of which 
s/he can move around at whim (signifying “agency”).  
Cardinale (2018) refers to “embedded(ness)” more than 40 times in his paper, and, 
as a result, nearly literally reproduces Giddens’ metaphorical room when he posits 
that structure “provides (…) a space of open possibilities (…) enjoy[ed]” by actors 
(p.133-145; italics added). It is this particular conceptual framing that produces his 
central problem: Is action really “fully autonomous” (p.148) in the space of 
possibilities that is “created” (p.142) by structure? And, if not, what are the 
“mechanisms” (p.133) through which action is still “influenced” (p.133) by structure 
within this space? What was originally presented by Holm (1995) and Seo and Creed 
(2002) as a paradox is, in this way, transformed into a seemingly tractable problem 
that admits a solution. Crucially, however, it is only when conceiving of the relation 
between structure and agency in terms of embeddedness – taken literally rather than 
paradoxically - that a search for mechanisms through which agency and structure 
exert their mutual influence is necessitated.  
Holm (1995), who never actually used the term “embedded agency”, as well as 
Seo and Creed (2002), were, arguably, aware that this apparent necessity is dispelled 
when the relation between structure and agency is understood as mutually 
constitutive; or, as Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: 20) more incisively put it, as 
“ontologically complicit”. This alternative understanding is advanced in strands of 
social theory that explicitly challenge Professor Cardinale’s thinking of agency and 
structure as existing on “distinct levels” (p.146) that influence each other. Practice 
theorists like Bourdieu (1977) and Giddens (1984) – to whom Cardinale (2018) 
liberally refers - conceive of agency as enabled and constrained “through” structure, 






























































not “by” it; and, relatedly, structure is theorized as “both medium and outcome” 
(Giddens, 1984: 25) of agentic practice.  
This practice-theoretic perspective is widely cited by institutional theorists but 
often selectively translated into a more familiar, affirming form – a general issue of 
imported ideas being “lost in translation”, to which we will return in the second part 
of this comment. Practice theory’s reconceptualization of the relation between 
structure and agency in terms of ontological complicity casts radical doubt on the 
coherence of “embeddedness” as a way of characterizing it. This, in turn, raises 
critical questions about the intelligibility of a research program that aspires to identify 
“mechanisms” of “embeddedness”. Whereas the reasoning of Holm (1995) and Seo 
and Creed (2002) is broadly congruent with a practice-theoretic perspective, 
Cardinale (2018) subscribes to a literal use of the embeddedness metaphor, which 
results in a Quixotic quest to solve a phantom problem of his own creation (see 
Planck, 1946). His search for mechanisms to connect structure and agency affirms 
and normalizes, rather than debunks and dispels, the theoretical difficulty that arises 
when agency and structure are conceptualized as oppositional, and/or existing on 
distinct levels. Unfortunately, Cardinale’s (2018) remedy for the “problem” of 
embedded agency in institutional theory reproduces its fault lines. 
Our difference with Cardinale (2018) could be reduced to a mere disagreement 
about whether to conceptualize action as enabled, constrained, or guided “by”, or 
“through”, structure, which may then be dismissed as a petty squabble over semantics. 
However, we believe that much more is at stake: failure to reflect critically on the 
effects of the widespread, naturalized use of the embeddedness metaphor in 
institutional theory impedes future theory development. In its absence, the 
appreciation of embedded agency as a paradox, rather than a problem, goes missing. 






























































This, in turn, leads to increasingly technical and abstract attempts to identify 
mechanisms that are conjectured to connect structure and agency, as exemplified by 
Cardinale’s (2018) appropriation of the Husserlian concept of protention. Such 
attempts inevitably result in the perpetuation of the very problem they seek to 
overcome, because they leave its source intact: the conceptualization of the structure-
agency relation as semi-independent, counterposed forces, sustained by a literal 
reading of the embeddedness metaphor. More importantly, the preoccupation with 
phantom problems that this never-ending cycle fosters diverts valuable research 
attention away from other important research problems that have more direct 
relevance for the analysis of organizational life. This includes, for example, the 
research questions that animated the seminal contributions of Holm (1995) and Seo 
and Creed (2002): when and how can people engage in change-oriented behavior? 
Ironically, the phantom problem of embedded agency that is commonly misattributed 
to these authors risks displacing important and relevant questions such as these.  
Using an Exotic Metaphor to Solve a Phantom Problem  
We now turn to a second, broader issue that arises from Professor Cardinale’s 
introduction of the Husserlian concept of “protention” as a resource for identifying 
mechanisms central to his theory. Namely, how are scholars to handle the importation 
of foreign intellectual traditions into management and organization theory?  
Cardinale (2018) commends protention “as a useful means of capturing the idea of 
proximity towards valuing some course of action rather than others” (p. 134) such that 
agency is guided or oriented to incline in a direction that “appears as inevitable” 
(p.147). This pre-reflective facet of agency, he contends, “has often gone unnoticed, 
and its implications are largely ignored” (p. 133). The first thing to note about this 
appeal to the concept of protention is its tenuous connection to Husserl’s coinage of 






























































the term, which relates to time consciousness, and specifically to the temporal horizon 
against which the present is perceived (Husserl, 1999). It is very difficult to connect 
or reconcile this meaning with Cardinale’s (2018) use of protention in relation to 
actors’ pre-reflective dispositions towards preferring particular courses of action. This 
difficulty is compounded by the absence of any considered discussion or justification 
of the concept’s importation and subsequent translation in Cardinale’s (2018) theory. 
Based on his brief acknowledgment that he uses the concept “more broadly” (p.136), 
we speculate that protention is deployed as a loose metaphor for a phenomenon that, 
at best, lacks a direct connection to, or basis in, Husserl’s phenomenology.  
As Oswick, Fleming and Hanlon (2011) point out, the importation and translation 
of foreign concepts and forms of theorizing can sometimes be productive for theory 
development. However, such borrowing or blending also frequently involves a 
process of domestication or colonization in which nuance and challenge is sacrificed. 
With regard to institutional theory, for example, this can have the (possibly 
unintended) deleterious effect of stifling or disarming challenges to its dominance in 
organization theory, with damaging consequences for theoretical pluralism (Willmott, 
2015; Lok, 2017). Before contemplating or commending the importation of exotic 
traditions like Husserl’s phenomenology, it is therefore appropriate to assess whether 
equivalent or greater inspiration or insights may be gained from theoretical traditions 
that are already influential in institutional theory.  
Through his many references to Giddens and Bourdieu, Cardinale (2018) takes the 
practice-theoretic tradition as his starting point for developing “new 
microfoundations”, yet he neglects to consider that this tradition incorporates an 
attentiveness to how, in his formulation, “structure actively orients actors toward 
some possibilities rather than others” (p.144). The process is illustrated at some length 






























































in Giddens’ commentary on Willlis’ Learning to Labour (Giddens, 1984: 289-307). 
More generally, the practice-theoretic tradition is also richly appreciative of pre-
reflective agency, including the influence of unconscious conditions of action. As 
Giddens (1984: 6) writes: “Unconscious motivation is a significant feature of human 
conduct” which includes “forms of cognition and impulsion which are either wholly 
repressed from consciousness of appear in consciousness only in distorted form”. 
Informed by such understandings, a number of institutional theorists have begun to 
study the psychodynamics of human agency (e.g. Voronov & Vince, 2012; Lok, 
Creed, DeJordy & Voronov, 2017). We therefore consider Cardinale’s (2018) resort 
to Husserl in his search for a pre-reflective dimension of agency largely redundant.  
With regard to the relevance of Husserl’s phenomenology for the advancement of 
institutional theory more generally, there are testing questions to answer about the 
commensurability of these two perspectives. Even though Husserl’s position within 
the realism-idealism spectrum has been subject to debate (e.g. Ameriks, 1977), his 
phenomenological method was specifically designed to break out of the 
representationalist onto-epistemic boundaries in which institutional theory, and with it 
most social science, are confined. At the core of Husserl’s mature work is a deep 
skepticism about the adequacy of what he calls the “natural attitude” as a basis for 
positive (social) science. As Giddens (1977: 10) puts it, footnoting Husserl’s The 
Crisis of the European Sciences, “Positive thought supposedly provides a medium for 
the principled corrigibility of the world of lay beliefs or the ‘natural attitude’, but 
actually accepts implicitly some fundamental elements of the natural attitude which 
remain concealed and therefore unexplicated.” Like most social science, institutional 
theory assumes and reproduces this natural attitude through, for example, the 
deployment of naturalized meanings ascribed to concepts like “embeddedness”, 






























































“agency” and “structure”. Husserl’s invitation is to suspend and replace causal 
theorizing that is based in such naturalized concepts through what he called “radical 
self-understanding”:  
[T]heoretical achievement (…) can only be and remain meaningful in a true 
and original sense if the scientist has developed in himself the ability to inquire 
back into the original meaning of all his meaning-structures and methods, i.e., 
into the historical meaning of their primal establishment, and especially into the 
meaning of all the inherited meanings taken over unnoticed in this primal 
establishment, as well as those taken over later on. (Husserl, 1970: 56) 
 
To be clear, we are not advocating a Husserlian approach, which we acknowledge 
to be highly problematical, and not least for advancing any form of social analysis. 
Where we consider Husserlian phenomenology to be of potential value is in its 
intrinsic orientation to exposing and problematizing the “unnoticed”, as explicitly 
formulated in the previous quote from Husserl (1970). This orientation enables a 
critical exploration of the “historical meaning” of concepts as a way of unearthing 
some of the “unnoticed” effects of their unreflexive appropriation and deployment in 
institutional theory. This possibility is frustrated when exotic concepts, such as 
“protention”, are engaged for purposes that are disassociated from their epistemic 
tradition. In our reading, Cardinale (2018) misjudges how the phenomenological 
tradition - established by Bretano and Husserl and then developed and applied by 
Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Schutz, Ricoeur and many others – may potentially 
contribute to the reconstruction of institutional theory’s microfoundations. For 
example, it might be asked: What is not seen when we naturally and “realistically” 
apprehend institutions in elemental terms of “structures”, “actors”, “embeddedness”, 
and “protention”?  
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